By Dr Pawan Kumar
In what could be described as a year of citizen protests around the world—mostly peaceful, though some violent—a unique scenario unfolded in the mother of democracy, India. While hearing a petition in S Rajaseekaran vs Union of India & Others concerning the construction of pedestrian infrastructure near the Delhi High Court, the Supreme Court bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and KV Viswanathan made an extraordinary oral observation: if basic pedestrian infrastructure at the Mathura Road crossing was not completed by November 25, 2026, when the case is scheduled to be heard again, they would peacefully sit in protest at the site.
The timing is particularly striking. November 26 marks the anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of India in 1949. The episode thus raises a larger constitutional question: what happens when public authorities fail to fulfil their obligations despite repeated judicial intervention?
WAS AN ORDER NOT SUFFICIENT?
A citizen should not have to brave the dangers of moving traffic simply to reach a court and seek the protection of the law. The absence of adequate pedestrian crossings near the Delhi High Court represents a basic failure of public administration. It also raises an uncomfortable question: when a problem repeatedly brought to the attention of the Supreme Court remains unresolved, what must a citizen do to secure an essential public service?
Judicial pronouncements carry the authority of law within the constitutional framework. Article 141 provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India, while Article 13 addresses laws inconsistent with fundamental rights. Yet, the effectiveness of judicial intervention ultimately depends on compliance. Even the strongest legal pronouncement cannot protect a pedestrian if the authorities responsible for implementing it fail to act.
So, why was an oral warning of this nature necessary? Was it the frustration of a bench confronted with a public interest petition that has remained pending since 2012? Or does the episode expose a more troubling pattern in which administrative inaction continues until judicial patience is exhausted?
On October 16, the Supreme Court expressed its frustration over pedestrian safety near the Delhi High Court on Mathura Road. When informed that a committee was examining the matter, the bench indicated that the judges themselves would sit on dharna if adequate steps were not taken.
The remark attracted considerable attention because of the unusual language employed by the judges. Yet, the real story lies beyond the headline-grabbing prospect of a judicial protest. It is the administrative delay that made such a warning necessary in the first place.
A pedestrian crossing is not a luxury. It is a basic public necessity. Lawyers, litigants, court staff and other visitors must be able to reach the court premises safely. For elderly people, persons with disabilities and those accompanying young children, crossing a busy road can be particularly hazardous. Public infrastructure must account for these realities rather than assume that everyone can move quickly through gaps in traffic.
THE LEGAL ANSWER: ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The location lends this failure particular constitutional significance. Access to justice is usually discussed in terms of legal aid, affordable representation and timely hearings. But these safeguards have limited practical value if reaching the courthouse itself involves avoidable danger.
Physical accessibility is an integral part of the broader idea of access to justice. A court cannot be considered genuinely accessible simply because its doors are open during working hours.
The constitutional framework already provides a basis for addressing this problem. The Supreme Court has recognised access to justice as a constitutional right, while disability legislation requires governments to take measures to improve accessibility in the built environment, including roads and public infrastructure. These obligations provide a compelling basis for demanding safe access to public institutions.
The immediate challenge, therefore, is not the absence of legal principles. It is translating those principles into functional infrastructure.
Committees can play a useful role in determining which agency is responsible, assessing traffic conditions and identifying an appropriate engineering solution. But their effectiveness must be judged by what follows. A pedestrian cannot cross a road safely on the strength of a meeting, an assurance or a proposal. Where a known risk exists, the real measure of administrative progress is the degree of protection actually available to the public.
The solution must also be carefully designed. Painting zebra stripes on a road may achieve little if vehicles fail to stop. A footbridge accessible only by stairs could exclude precisely those who need safe passage the most. Authorities must assess crossing times, visibility, vehicle speeds, lighting and connections to adjoining footpaths.
The objective must be to provide infrastructure that works in real traffic conditions and accommodates people who cannot walk quickly or climb steps. Safety cannot be measured merely by the completion of construction; it must be measured by whether people can use the facility safely.
Responsibility for implementation must be equally clear. The agencies concerned should designate an officer to coordinate the work, publish a realistic completion schedule and explain any delays. Temporary safety measures should be introduced while permanent infrastructure is being built. Once completed, the crossing must be inspected under actual traffic conditions to determine whether it provides adequate protection. Maintenance must remain an ongoing responsibility.
Judicial oversight should focus on these measurable outcomes. The Court can seek evidence of implementation and require explanations when commitments are not honoured, while leaving technical decisions to the relevant experts. This would give practical force to judicial directions and prevent successive hearings from becoming occasions for repeating assurances that have failed to produce results.
FINAL WORDS
The Supreme Court’s dharna remark should be more than a source of amusement or another headline. It should lead to a tangible improvement: a crossing that people can use with confidence and an administrative system capable of responding without repeated judicial intervention.
The same urgency should apply to roads outside hospitals, schools and other public institutions, where unsafe access can undermine the delivery of essential services.
The problem near the Delhi High Court is sufficiently limited to be resolved and sufficiently serious to demand immediate attention. A timely solution would demonstrate that public authorities understand compliance not as a bureaucratic formality, but as a duty owed to citizens.
No one approaching a court should have to rely on the goodwill of a passing motorist to reach its entrance safely. The protection promised within the courtroom must begin on the road outside.
Perhaps the judges have also delivered a pointed message to public works departments: complete projects within the prescribed time, or risk finding the judiciary contemplating remedies beyond conventional orders and contempt proceedings. A touch of judicial humour may occasionally communicate frustration more effectively than another stern direction.
But the ultimate test is simple. Whether through an order, a warning or an extraordinary threat of peaceful protest, the work must get done.
—The writer teaches at Amity Law School, Amity University, Noida
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