By Annunthra Rangan
Since its violent birth in 1971, Bangladesh has struggled to secure enduring institutional stability. From the trauma of Partition to cycles of military rule and dynastic political rivalry, Dhaka has rarely enjoyed the continuity needed to consolidate democracy. Today, once again, the country stands at a volatile crossroads—torn between competing street movements, fluid ideological realignments, and an unsettled diplomatic posture. What unfolds in Bangladesh now will shape South Asia’s strategic balance and force India to recalibrate its neighbourhood policy at a time of intensifying regional competition.
Understanding this moment requires looking beyond sporadic unrest to the deeper renegotiation of power underway in Dhaka. The student-led movement that ousted Sheikh Hasina in 2024 did more than topple a government. It ended a decade of relatively stable governance that India considered one of the most productive periods in bilateral relations—marked by advances in border management, counter-terrorism cooperation, and connectivity. But Hasina’s exit did not ease underlying tensions; instead, it exposed simmering public frustration over shrinking democratic space, economic precarity, and a widening disconnect between political elites and citizen expectations.
The turbulence deepened when Sharif Osman Hadi—the leading face of the 2024 pro-democracy uprising—succumbed to injuries from an armed attack outside a mosque after being flown to Singapore for treatment. His death ignited nationwide protests and widespread anger that spilled into targeted arson attacks on newspaper offices accused of aligning with the old political order and perceived as sympathetic to Indian interests. Symbolically, this marked a turning point: India ceased to be viewed as a distant stakeholder and began to be seen as implicated in Bangladesh’s internal power struggle.
Diplomatic consequences followed swiftly. India and Bangladesh suspended visa and consular services, citing security concerns. Though seemingly procedural, the move heightened tensions, illustrating how domestic unrest had morphed into bilateral friction. New Delhi faced a delicate dilemma—any visible criticism risked being construed as interference, while silence risked being read as indifference.
Meanwhile, political realignments accelerated with Tarique Rahman’s dramatic return from exile, reviving the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) at a moment of intense public hostility towards entrenched authority. For India, this matters. Historically, BNP-led governments have adopted a more cautious stance towards New Delhi while maintaining greater openness towards China and Pakistan, often driven by Bangladesh’s need for sustained investment and development capital. With domestic politics still unsettled, Dhaka’s external alignments are once again in play.
Complicating matters further is the resurgence of Islamist-leaning actors and street-based mobilisation by groups previously considered peripheral. Their influence stems less from electoral strength than from their ability to shape public mood. Increasingly, political legitimacy in Bangladesh can be gained by opposing India—regardless of whether that stance translates into coherent policy.
The interim government has responded by broadening its diplomatic horizon, signalling that Bangladesh seeks strategic flexibility, not dependence on any single power. Engagement with Pakistan—symbolically powerful despite practical limits—suggests Dhaka wants options. For Islamabad, this is an opportunity to regain relevance in a region where its footprint had waned.
For India, the consequences are deeply strategic. Bangladesh is integral to India’s eastern security architecture—serving as a corridor to the Northeast, a partner in counter-terrorism, and an anchor for connectivity projects linking the subcontinent to Southeast Asia. Prolonged instability or escalated anti-India mobilisation could disrupt infrastructure initiatives, slow
energy cooperation, and create room for external powers to expand influence in the Bay of Bengal.
China is already embedded in Bangladesh’s development and infrastructure landscape. Continued political flux could enhance Beijing’s leverage just as India seeks to consolidate its neighbourhood partnerships, as it did recently in Sri Lanka. Pakistan’s renewed outreach, though limited, further complicates the equation. In this environment, hesitation by New Delhi risks ceding strategic ground.
The February 2026 national election looms as a pivotal test. If conducted with sufficient transparency to secure broad acceptance, it could create the political legitimacy needed for a diplomatic reset. Without such credibility, any bilateral engagement will remain hostage to the next eruption of street politics.
India’s immediate challenge is to rebuild trust without appearing interventionist. Quiet diplomacy, discreet consultations, and sustained economic engagement are likely to prove more effective than public signalling or visible pressure. Bangladesh, meanwhile, must resist normalising anti-India sentiment as a default political currency. While such mobilisation may offer short-term advantage, it narrows Bangladesh’s strategic options in areas such as connectivity, border security, and market access.
The most realistic future for India-Bangladesh relations is neither dramatic reconciliation nor outright rupture, but a gradual, uneven stabilisation—shaped by developments in Dhaka and careful calibration in New Delhi. Progress will depend on the conduct of elections, the stability of streets, and the willingness of both sides to separate diplomacy from domestic agitation.
Ultimately, the decisive question is whether both countries can exercise restraint long enough to preserve space for engagement while managing internal pressures. In a region where political tremors swiftly become strategic realities, South Asia cannot afford prolonged uncertainty—nor can it afford to leave the field open to China.
—The writer is a Senior Research Officer at Chennai Centre for China Studies. Her research interests constitute China-WANA (West Asia and North Africa) relations and human rights
End of an era
Khaleda Zia, the first female prime minister of Bangladesh whose long rivalry with Sheikh Hasina defined the country’s politics for a generation died on December 30, 2025, after a prolonged illness. Zia, 80, was one of the most significant and divisive political figures in the country since Bangladesh’ independence and was the long-time chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Zia served two full terms as Bangladesh’s prime minister—from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006—after playing a key role, often in coordination with arch-rival Hasina, in restoring parliamentary democracy in the country. Her death closes a chapter in Bangladeshi politics that was dominated by the two women, both victims of personal tragedies. Her son, Tarique Rahman, is expected to lead the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in the elections scheduled for February.
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