By Sanjay Raman Sinha
On October 10, Delhi’s Jantar Mantar witnessed a massive protest led by CJP, drawing protesters, students and members of the general public. What followed soon made headlines. Police swung into action, lathi-charged protesters who were described as peaceful, and bundled them into vans for transportation to detention centres.
In a parallel development, around 60 advocates, including women and senior lawyers, were rounded up and detained near the Supreme Court premises. Hours later, following a communication from the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) to the chief justice of India seeking intervention, the authorities were asked to release the advocates. They were subsequently freed.
The episode has raised fundamental questions about the right to protest, the freedom of movement and the ability of lawyers to discharge their professional responsibilities without obstruction.
The SCBA approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the alleged manhandling and detention of lawyers and raising concerns over restrictions on internet services, public movement and access to courts.
The Association sought a detailed status report on the police action, the reasons for the detentions, the preservation of CCTV footage, the identification of officers involved and the use of force against advocates. It also alleged that barricades and other restrictions had obstructed access to the Supreme Court and other court complexes in Delhi.
SCBA President Pradeep Rai defended the advocates’ right to protest. “Lawyers have a constitutional right to protest peacefully against the government and to speak out against policies, decisions or actions with which they disagree. When our fellow advocates were detained near their chambers and along Supreme Court Road, we opposed their detention and conveyed our objections to the authorities. They were subsequently released. At the same time, when expressing disagreement with a court or an institution, particularly the Supreme Court, we must preserve its dignity and maintain decorum. Dissent and institutional respect must go hand in hand. As lawyers, we have a responsibility both to defend the right to dissent and to safeguard the dignity of the Constitution and the institutions entrusted with upholding it, ” he said.
The petition has become part of a larger set of pleas concerning mass detentions, the suspension of metro services and internet shutdowns. Yet, the SCBA’s intervention raises a question that is distinct from the wider controversy: do lawyers enjoy any special protection when exercising their right to protest, and how should that right be reconciled with their professional obligations to the courts?
The starting point is straightforward. Lawyers, as citizens of India, enjoy the fundamental right to peaceful assembly and protest, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. Their professional status does not extinguish their constitutional freedoms. Equally, however, membership of the Bar does not confer privileges unavailable to other citizens.
Former Supreme Court judge Justice Shiva Kirti Singh explained the distinction to India Legal. “Constitutionally, lawyers have no special protection; all citizens have equal rights and no profession enjoys extra rights. Lawyers must be allowed to do their duty without disturbance. The protesting lawyers had no Bar Council or Bar Association resolution. Outside the court all are equal. However, if a lawyer in uniform states he is going for professional work, he should not be stopped. Obstructing him interferes with court functioning, and authorities should facilitate his access to the courtroom.”
The distinction is important. Lawyers do not possess a separate constitutional right to protest merely because they belong to the legal profession. But neither can their professional status be used to deny them rights available to other citizens. The obligation on the authorities is to enforce lawful restrictions proportionately while ensuring that access to justice is not impeded.
In Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan vs Union of India (2018), a case concerning restrictions on protests at Jantar Mantar, the Supreme Court recognised protest as an integral feature of democratic life. At the same time, it emphasised the need to balance the rights of protesters against the interests of residents, commuters and the public at large. Regulation must be reasonable; a restriction cannot simply become a blanket denial of the right itself.
For lawyers, however, the question has an additional complication. The strongest legal obstacle to a lawyers’ strike is not merely the regulation of public protest. It is the judiciary’s own insistence that advocates cannot abandon their professional responsibilities in the name of collective action.
In Ex-Captain Harish Uppal vs Union of India (2003), the Supreme Court ruled that lawyers have no right to strike or boycott courts, not even for a token period. Such action breaches their obligations to clients and obstructs the administration of justice. The judgment made clear that judges are not bound to adjourn cases simply because lawyers have called a strike.
The ruling did not, however, extinguish the right of lawyers to express dissent. It identified other means of protest, including press statements, television interviews, banners, armbands, peaceful marches away from court premises, dharnas and relay fasts.
The principle is that protest must not come at the cost of the litigant, whose access to justice depends on the advocate’s professional commitment. A lawyer may disagree with a government, criticise an institution or participate in political action, but cannot use a collective boycott to bring judicial work to a standstill.
THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY
The tension between protest and professional duty has repeatedly surfaced in attempts to regulate the Bar.
In February 2025, the centre’s draft Advocates (Amendment) Bill proposed inserting Section 35A to prohibit strikes, boycotts and abstention from court work as professional misconduct. The proposal triggered nationwide protests, with the Bar Council of India arguing that it threatened the autonomy of the legal profession. The centre withdrew the draft on February 22, 2025, promising fresh consultations.
The episode illustrated the difficulty of reconciling two competing imperatives: ensuring that courts function without disruption and preserving the independence of lawyers from executive interference.
Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules sets out advocates’ duties to the court, clients, opponents and colleagues. These professional obligations do not amount to a blanket prohibition on political activity. Advocates may join political parties, contest elections and address rallies. The line is crossed when professional privileges are abused through contemptuous conduct in court, disruption of judicial proceedings or behaviour that undermines the dignity of the Bar.
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BAR
India’s legal profession has never been politically neutral. Lawyers played a prominent role in the freedom struggle, often placing political conviction above professional advancement.
During the Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-21, prominent lawyers such as Motilal Nehru, CR Das, Rajendra Prasad and Vallabhbhai Patel gave up lucrative legal practices as part of the boycott of colonial institutions. Many of the framers of the Constitution were themselves lawyers, bringing to the constitutional project an understanding of both legal institutions and the struggle against arbitrary authority.
During the Emergency of 1975-77, lawyers were among those detained by the State. Resistance within the legal community to the suspension of civil liberties, particularly the denial of habeas corpus, remains a significant chapter in India’s constitutional history.
The contemporary record of the Bar, however, is more complicated. Frequent strikes in district courts contributed to the circumstances that led to the Harish Uppal ruling. Collective action has sometimes defended legitimate professional interests, but it has also deprived litigants of representation and delayed the delivery of justice.
The confrontation between lawyers and police in Delhi in November 2019 demonstrated how quickly institutional disputes can escalate. On November 2, a clash at Tis Hazari court, during which police fired at lawyers’ vehicles, was followed by retaliatory assaults on police personnel at Saket court the next day. The Delhi High Court ordered that no coercive action be taken against the lawyers booked in connection with the incidents, and the centre sought clarification. Strikes continued for weeks before the Bar Council of India condemned the violence at Saket and urged lawyers to resume work.
The episode underscored the dangers of allowing professional solidarity to override the rule of law. Neither the police nor lawyers can claim immunity from accountability when violence or misconduct occurs.
WHEN THE COURT ENTERS THE POLITICAL ARENA
Politics and the judiciary make uneasy bedfellows. Any attempt to bring them into close proximity, particularly in a politically charged dispute, invites scrutiny.
The chief justice of India’s reported concern that the Supreme Court should not be “dragged into political disputes” is not without merit. Courts must remain open to genuine constitutional grievances, but they must also guard against being used as instruments of political theatre.
The controversy surrounding the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process and the Chief Election Commissioner illustrates the dilemma. Rahul Gandhi sought a meeting with the CJI over the SIR-CEC dispute, but the request was declined. Subsequently, Congress leaders Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra led a procession towards the Supreme Court, while a legal team filed a petition concerning the same dispute.
The sequence raises legitimate questions about the relationship between political mobilisation and recourse to judicial remedies. A constitutional petition is a lawful means of seeking redress, and political leaders are entitled to articulate their concerns. But when litigation and street mobilisation are closely choreographed, the distinction between pursuing a legal remedy and staging a political demonstration can become blurred.
That proximity has a further consequence. When lawyers become overt political actors in disputes involving the courts, public confidence in the neutrality of the Bar may suffer. The distinction between professional protest and political agitation becomes harder to sustain, while the state may find it easier to justify restrictions on the profession in the name of protecting judicial functioning.
Yet, the answer cannot be to insulate lawyers from political expression or to treat every protest as an assault on institutional dignity. The independence of the Bar is itself an essential component of the rule of law. A profession unable to question authority would be poorly equipped to defend the rights of citizens against arbitrary State action.
The challenge is to preserve that independence without allowing political loyalties to compromise professional obligations or turn courts into collateral arenas of political confrontation.
The Supreme Court’s consideration of the present controversy, therefore, offers an opportunity to clarify several interconnected questions: the right of lawyers to peaceful protest, the limits imposed by their professional duties, the legality and proportionality of police action, and the obligation of the authorities to preserve access to courts.
The constitutional balance must protect both the citizen’s right to dissent and the litigant’s right to justice. Neither can be sacrificed to the convenience of the state, the political ambitions of a party or the collective demands of a professional association.
Ultimately, the strength of the Bar lies not in its ability to shut down courts or mobilise political power, but in its capacity to defend constitutional freedoms while upholding the institutions on which those freedoms depend.
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