By Sanjay Raman Sinha
Two recent cases have once again brought into sharp focus the uneasy equation between State power and the personal liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
The first concerns Akriti Chaudhary (24), a student detained under the National Security Act (NSA) in connection with the April 2026 workers’ protest in Noida. The second involves independent journalist Abhishek Upadhyay, who, after being booked in a road rage case, found his digital footprints being sought by the Ghaziabad Crime Branch.
The facts and legal issues in the two cases are different. But they share a larger constitutional concern: the extent to which investigative and administrative powers can intrude upon the freedoms of individuals.
In Chaudhary’s case, the matter reached the Allahabad High Court, which quashed her NSA detention and sharply criticised the manner in which the order had been passed. The Court found that the grounds of detention lacked adequate material and had been passed without proper application of mind. It also directed that Rs five lakh in compensation be recovered from the salaries of the officials found responsible, including the Gautam Buddh Nagar District Magistrate Medha Roopam. The Court further directed that its displeasure be recorded in the service records of the officials concerned.
The Court was particularly critical of the State’s reliance on allegations that Chaudhary had incited violence during the workers’ protest. It found insufficient material to justify the extraordinary preventive detention power of the NSA.
The judgment went further. It warned that the continued exercise of such powers by errant officials could reduce Uttar Pradesh to an “Orwellian Dystopia”.
The compensation order is particularly significant. Courts have previously awarded compensation for unlawful detention, but the direction in this case that the amount be recovered from the salaries of officials personally involved in the decision places a different emphasis on individual administrative accountability.
The district magistrate has since challenged that direction before the Supreme Court.
The constitutional principle at stake is hardly new. In Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court established that a procedure depriving a person of personal liberty must satisfy the requirements of fairness, justice and reasonableness. Articles 14, 19 and 21 together provide a constitutional framework against arbitrary State action.
The Allahabad High Court’s observations also resonate with a broader judicial recognition that participation in a protest cannot, by itself, be equated with criminality. Peaceful assembly and expression remain constitutionally protected, subject to legitimate restrictions prescribed by law. In Chaudhary’s case, the Court stressed that the State cannot prevent public gatherings merely on the basis of an assumed breach of peace.
The second case began very differently. Independent journalist Abhishek Upadhyay was booked by the Ghaziabad Police following an alleged road rage incident. The FIR includes allegations under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Upadhyay disputes the allegations and has claimed that the case is retaliatory because of his reporting on alleged irregularities concerning donations to the Ram Temple in Ayodhya.
The Supreme Court granted him interim protection from coercive action. Then the case took an unexpected turn.
Upadhyay was informed by X that the Ghaziabad Crime Branch had sought extensive information relating to his account, including IP and device information, from June 1, 2026—weeks before the alleged road rage incident of August 18.
His lawyers argued that the breadth and time period of the request had no apparent connection with the road rage allegation and could expose confidential journalistic sources. They linked the requested period to the time when Upadhyay was working on his reporting concerning alleged irregularities in Ram Temple donations. Those allegations remain contested.
The Supreme Court took note of the apparent mismatch. At the hearing, a bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana asked the Ghaziabad Police to explain why such digital information was required in connection with the road rage case. The CJI specifically raised the question of where the limits and guidelines should lie when investigators obtain a person’s digital footprint, particularly when confidential information could enter the case record.
The question goes beyond Upadhyay. A person’s digital footprint can reveal far more than a conventional piece of evidence. It can disclose movements, contacts, associations, communications and, in the case of a journalist, potentially the identity of sources.
That brings three constitutional values into direct contact: privacy, proportionality and press freedom.
In Justice KS Puttaswamy (retd) vs Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court recognised privacy as intrinsic to dignity, liberty and the protection guaranteed by Article 21. State intrusion must satisfy constitutional requirements, including legality, a legitimate aim, necessity and safeguards against arbitrary or excessive interference.
The proportionality question becomes particularly important when investigators seek information far wider than the alleged offence appears to require.
If the investigation concerns a road accident or alleged road rage, how much unrelated digital history can legitimately be examined? Where is the line between a reasonable investigative request and an indiscriminate trawl through a citizen’s private life?
For journalists, there is another layer. Confidential sources are not simply another category of personal contact. Investigative journalism frequently depends upon the ability of sources to communicate without automatically exposing themselves to State scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised the importance of a free press. In Vinod Dua vs Union of India (2021), the Court quashed a sedition FIR against the journalist and reiterated the constitutional protection available to criticism of government, subject to the established limits concerning incitement and public disorder.
In the Pegasus case, Manohar Lal Sharma vs Union of India (2021), the Supreme Court examined allegations concerning surveillance and emphasised the constitutional significance of privacy, particularly in a democracy where journalism depends upon the ability to protect sources.
The two cases are, therefore, not identical. One concerns preventive detention and the extraordinary power of the NSA. The other concerns police investigation and access to digital information. But both raise the same foundational question: what safeguards prevent legitimate State power from becoming arbitrary State power?
The answer lies not in weakening the State’s ability to investigate crime or maintain public order. A constitutional democracy necessarily gives the State substantial powers to do both. The real test is whether those powers are exercised within the boundaries drawn by the Constitution.
The Chaudhary case places personal liberty and preventive detention under the microscope. The Upadhyay proceedings place privacy, digital surveillance and the protection of journalistic sources in the frame.
Together, they underline a principle at the heart of constitutional government: the State is powerful precisely because the Constitution gives it power—but that same Constitution also tells the State where its power must stop.
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